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The success of luxury brands in Japan and their uncertain future 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Japanese are the world’s largest individual consumers of luxury brands 
and  form  the  second  largest  market  for  luxury  goods  after  the  US.  The 
Japanese  were  the  driving  force  behind  the  exponential  growth  of  the 
European luxury industry and the resulting “democratization of luxury”. This 
concept  of giving  everyone  access  to  luxury  branded goods  is  a  paradox 
because  it  abandons  the  exclusivity  that  was  the  original  basis  of  the 
European luxury industry in the hands of skilled designers and craftsmen. 
By making luxury branded goods widely accessible to most consumers they 
run a major risk of becoming simply too ‘common’. The 2007-8 economic 
crisis adversely affected the luxury market, producing a general backlash 
against  ‘conspicuous  consumption’.  In  Japan, as  in  most  countries  in  the 
world, the crisis reduced consumers’ discretionary spending, but in addition 
it  also  accelerated  the  fundamental  shift  in  the  attitude  and  behavior  of 
Japanese luxury consumers. 
 
Keywords: Japanese consumers of luxury brands, Japan the largest luxury 
market in the world, conspicuous consumption, democratization of luxury, 
luxury  brands  as  status  symbols,  luxury  brands  as  badges  of  economic 
success, parasite singles 
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Introduction 
Marketing of branded goods was primarily developed in the United 
States (US) starting in the second half of the 19
th century. American 
company Procter & Gamble for example introduced its Ivory soap brand in 
1879, developed it into a national US brand in 1882 and after the Second 
World War into a world brand (Degen, July, 2009). The more sophisticated 
marketing of luxury branded goods was developed in Europe and expanded 
worldwide from the 1970s onward driven mainly by French, Italian and 
Swiss companies such as Luis Vuitton, Hermes, Chanel, Bulgari, Gucci, 
Prada, Cartier and Rolex  just to mention a few. 
The driving force behind the exponential growth of the European 
luxury industry was the so called “democratization of luxury”. This concept 
of giving everyone access to luxury branded goods is a paradox because it 
abandons the exclusivity that formed the original basis of the European 
luxury industry in the hands of skilled designers and craftsmen. By making 
luxury branded goods widely accessible to most consumers they run the 
major risk of their becoming too ‘common’ or vulgar. 
The overall luxury market in 2008 was estimated by McKinsey Asia 
(Atsmon et al., 2009) to be 131 billion United States dollars (USD). These 
luxury brand sales include ready-to-wear clothing, fragrances, cosmetics, 
skin care, leather goods, footwear, accessories, watches, and jewelry. Of 
total luxury sales, 52 billion USD were in Europe, 26 billion in the United 
States (US), 20 billion in Japan, 24 billion in the rest of Asia, and only 9 
billion in the rest of the world (Figure 1). Despite the financial crisis the 
overall growth in sales from 2007 to 2008 was 5 percent, with the US 
growing 1 percent; Europe 7 percent; the rest of Asia, led by China, 
growing by 17 percent; and the rest of the world by 9 percent. Japan 
however showed a significant 7 percent decline, especially notable because 
Japan is the world’s most concentrated source of revenue for luxury brands 
with the highest per capita spending on luxury brands in the world. This 
spending figure is almost the double that of the US (Figure 2).  
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Figure 1. Luxury market by region in billions of USD 
 
Source: Atsmon et al., 2009 
 
An interesting curiosity that we are going to explore in this paper is 
that the concept of ‘democratization of luxury’ was actually inspired by the 
Japanese luxury brand consumer and their voracious need for conspicuous 
consumption in pursuit of social esteem. This is in essence the same luxury 
consumption concept described by Thorstein Veblen (1994, first published in 
1899) in regard to the newly rich industrial barons at the end of the 19
th 
century. Veblen (1994, p. 74), describing the luxury consumption of these 
industrial barons, wrote: 
Since the consumption of more excellent goods is an evidence of 
wealth, it becomes honorific; and conversely, the failure to consume 
in due quantity and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and 
demerit. 
This conspicuous consumption need so clearly defined by Veblen is not 
limited to Japan. It has spread all over Asia and today luxury brands are 
modern symbols Asians wear to redefine their identity and social status 
(Degen, June, 2009). 
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The noteworthy decline of luxury brands sales in Japan can be 
attributed to four factors: the financial crisis of 2007-8; the bursting of the 
luxury brand bubble of the early 2000s; the rapid aging of the Japanese 
population - that outweighs all other nations; and a possible long-term shift 
in consumer attitudes and behavior toward luxury brands by the Japanese. 
The financial crisis is the most recent factor, but as it is one that has 
affected all markets it alone does not explain the singular behavior of the 
Japanese luxury consumers. The financial crisis may however have been 
responsible for triggering the bursting of the luxury brand bubble that had 
begun in the early 2000s when newly rich bankers, traders, real-estate 
agents, and entrepreneurs started spending money on luxury goods. This 
spending was further encouraged by a massive expansion of luxury brand 
stores in Japan, as exemplified by luxury retail extravaganzas such as 
2001’s 138 million USD eleven-story glass-brick Hermes flagship store in 
the Ginza, Tokyo’s primary shopping district (Chadha & Husband, 2006, p. 
75-76); 2002’s 100 million USD six-floor Louis Vuitton flagship store in 
Omotesando, a tree-lined neighborhood in Tokyo known as an art and 
culture hotspot; 2003’s 80 million USD six-story Prada temple to 
postmodernism flagship store, also in Omotesando; and 2004’s 240 million 
USD ten-floor Chanel flagship store in the Ginza with its absurdly expensive 8 
     
décor including glittering silver dust on the pillars and gold-ribbon panels on 
the walls (Thomas, 2008, p. 94).  
The last two factors – the rapid aging of the Japanese population, and 
a possible long-term shift in Japanese consumer attitudes and behavior 
toward luxury brands and its implications for the luxury industry – are the 
central themes of this study. In this paper we will cover the origin of luxury, 
the advent of luxury industry, the ‘democratization of luxury’ brands, the 
Japanese-motivated spread of luxury brands, the luxury brand addicted 
Japanese, and the uncertain future of the luxury brand industry in Japan. 
 
The origin of luxury 
The origin of luxury goes back to the dawn of humanity to the time 
when we parted company from our ape ancestors. Our most primitive 
forefathers used objects to adorn themselves and to differentiate 
themselves from others in their communities according to their social 
position. From the time mankind started burying its dead we find objects 
that differentiate them. The more important in their community the person 
buried was, the more precious the artifacts found in their graves. These 
artifacts were symbols of their social standing and in some cases included 
jewelry, weapons, horses and even ships. 
The word luxury derives from the Latin ‘luxus’ which can be translated 
as ‘superfluous abundance’. The concept of luxury is essentially relative to 
the time period and the social and moral norms that a person subscribes to. 
The prevailing notion is of relatively large consumption of wealth for 
unessential pleasure. There is no real line separating luxury, comfort and 
necessity and it is common in today’s world that that the luxury of one 
generation becomes the necessity of a subsequent generation. Perhaps the 
best way to understand luxury is to define it as ‘expenditure in excess of the 
normal and customary standard of living of the class to which the 
individuals concerned belong’. 
Luxury has played a great role in the historical economic, social and 
political development of humanity. In Italy and France, the classic lands of 
luxury, the luxurious expenditures of the papacy and of the courts in the 
Middle Ages had an important influence upon economic development by 9 
     
promoting the accumulation of wealth and thus creating markets for certain 
industries. It also contributed to giving a new direction to art with the rise 
of the Italian merchant princes that replaced the church as the major 
patrons of the arts. The simple piety of the Middle Ages gave way to the 
sumptuous paganism of the Renaissance period. In another direction it led 
to the disruption of the old feudal social order with the revolutionary turmoil 
in France. The continual drain of wealth from the countryside to sustain the 
luxurious lives of the privileged nobles in Paris and Versailles produced on 
the one hand a considerable amount of industrial activity, but on the other 
hand led to the popular discontent that fueled the French Revolution. 
The desire for luxury generates an inevitable commitment to the 
growth of wealth and brings with it an increase and differentiation of wants. 
For the great majority of the people, those able through their heritage or 
personal effort to obtain luxury generate a mixture of envy and approval as 
role models. The general demand for luxury is a great stimulus to economic 
progress, for it provides an enormously strong incentive to work, and to 
search for success and its associated wealth. In some cases though, it 
brings out some less desirable human characteristics such as greed, which 
may in turn lead to direct dishonesty such as the Madoff Ponzi Scheme 
(Financial Times, 2009, December 22) or to the more subtle moral hazard 
of the bankers that was the main cause of the 2007-8 financial crisis 
(Degen, October, 2009). 
Veblen (1994), in his Theory of the leisure class, stated that the evils 
and low standards of luxury expenditures are not confined to the privileged 
wealthy class but propagate and are imitated right down the social pyramid. 
Because of these evils moralists have frequently attacked luxury 
consumption on ethical grounds. In Ancient Greece there was the secular 
conflict between two life styles: the luxury of Athens and the austerity of 
Sparta. This conflict between luxury and austerity is ageless: from the 
Stoics in Ancient Greece who condemned luxury because it ran counter to 
their ideals of simplicity; the supporters of the Old Republic in Ancient Rome 
and its series of sumptuary laws (the first law was the Lex Oppia passed in 
215 BC and repealed in 195 BC; this law restricted not only a woman’s 
possession of wealth, but also her display of wealth); the early Christians 10 
     
that exalted asceticism and poverty as their ideal; the Puritans who feared 
that luxury would imperil the immortal soul; and the Socialists who consider 
the coexistence of luxury with poverty to be immoral. 
 
The advent of the luxury brands industry 
The first luxury brand in the style that we know luxury brands today 
originated in Paris at the end of the 19
th century, when the first designer 
label was created. Ironically the creator was Charles Frederick Worth, an 
Englishman. Before Worth dressmakers did not create styles or dictated 
fashion, they were mere suppliers who made up copies of gowns that their 
wealthy clients had seen in illustrated journals, or had admired at social 
gatherings. The clients themselves chose the fabrics and colors, and dresses 
were constructed around them. Worth was the first couturier to impose his 
own taste on women and so was also the first celebrity fashion designer 
(Tungate, 2008, p. 9-10). 
Worth established himself after working at the drapery house of 
‘Gargelin & Opigez’ at 83 Rue Richelieu in Paris. With the backing of a 
wealthy young Swedish draper called Otto Bobergh the new couturier atelier 
‘Worth & Bobergh’ was established at 7 Rue de la Paix in 1858. Worth had a 
number of influential clients but his big break came when Empress Eugenie, 
the wife of Napoleon III, spotted a dress he’d made and summoned him to 
design dresses for her. After this episode, Worth was dressing the world’s 
most famous and glamorous women. 
Worth was also a marketing genius. He was the first couturier to sit his 
clients down and give them a little show by attractive young women 
dressed in his creations, thus inventing the concept of fashion models. 
Another of his ideas was to identify fashionable women on whom he could 
place his dresses, knowing that they would create a buzz as they mingled in 
high society. In addition, Worth looked and acted like a proper fashion 
designer as dressed in velvet with a cigar between his ostentatiously be-
ringed fingers he would greet clients while reclining on a divan. He also had 
a capricious temper; potential clients could be turned down, and existing 
clients banished (Tungate, 2008, p. 10). 11 
     
By the time he died in 1885, Worth had established a pattern for all 
subsequent designers to follow. He had created many of the basics of 
contemporary fashion and luxury brand marketing. He had created the 
runway shows, fashion models, celebrity models, elitism, and a charismatic 
and eccentric brand spokesman. After his death the ‘Maison Worth’ 
continued under the direction of his sons and the Worth luxury label 
continue to sell luxury beyond the 1920s with the launch of branded Worth 
perfume in 1925 (Tungate, 2008, p. 11). 
A new designer took central stage in the early 1900s. Paul Poiret 
started working for ‘Maison Worth’ but soon began to challenge the 
restrictive style of his employers. In 1904 he opened his own shop in the 
Rue du Faubourg Saint Honoré and started altering the outline of women’s 
clothing. Like Worth, Poiret too had a sophisticated approach to promoting 
his products. In 1911 he became the first couturier to launch a branded 
perfume, called ‘Rosine’. The same year, he threw an extravaganza party 
called The thousand and second night to which the most fashionable names 
in Europe were invited and attended dressed as Persian royalty or as 
followers of Scheherazade (Tungate, 2008, p. 12). 
Poiret opened branded luxury boutiques in major French cities, and 
organized traveling fashion shows.  But despite his talent and marketing he 
could not stop fashion’s constant change. Following the First World War, 
during the 1920s, Gabrielle ‘Coco’ Chanel considered  Poiret’s dresses to be 
costumes rather than clothes and decided to take fashion into the 20
th 
century. During the First World War, women had worked in factories and 
fields, and grown accustomed to the simplicity of uniforms. Women had 
become less overtly feminine, so Chanel, and notably Jean Patou, created 
and promoted the androgynous style (Tungate, 2008, p. 13). 
The Second World War changed everything again. During the German 
occupation of France from 1940 to 1945 the focus of fashion and luxury 
brands shifted from Paris to New York. Before the war American women 
bought expensive gowns imported from Paris, or had more affordable copies 
made in the US. With the war the manufacturers on New York’s Seventh 
Avenue got a boost, and in the 1940s the locale became the birthplace of 12 
     
ready-to-wear fashion. The Americans went on to challenge the hegemony 
of Paris as the world’s fashion capital. 
After the Second World War, Christian Dior in Paris with his visionary 
designs and promotional genius took the center stage in luxury fashion. He 
invented ‘The new look’ that proved to be a money making machine. He 
launched his first perfume in 1947 and a ready-to-wear store in New York in 
1948. During the 1950s he licensed his Dior luxury brand to a range of ties 
and stockings and opened Dior branches all over the world (Tungate, 2008, 
p. 14). When he died prematurely in 1957 he was employing over a 
thousand people - something completely new for a couturier. Dior’s 
important contribution to luxury brand marketing was the demonstration 
that luxury could be repackaged as a mass product. He was the pioneer of 
the ‘democratization of luxury’. 
Dior’s success inspired today’s luxury brand marketing. Already in the 
1960s when fashion was democratized marketers became the determinants 
of the luxury brand fashion. Tungate (2008, p. 15), explaining the 
hegemony of marketers, writes: 
When asked who invented the mini-skirts, herself or the French 
designer André Courrèges, Mary Quant replied generously, ‘Neither – 
it was invented by the street.’ Nevertheless, Quant was one of 
several designers who translated the ‘sixties youth culture’ into profit, 
with considerable success. 
 
Pierre Cardin, a protégé of Christian Dior, noted very early the decline 
of haute couture and the potential of ready-to-wear (prêt-à-porter) and 
successfully got a corner of the Parisian department store Printemps 
reserved exclusively for his brand. He surpassed Dior in extending his brand 
to more than 800 different products around the world. Cardin seems to 
have been more interested in promoting his label than his designs, a 
licensing strategy that nevertheless made him a vast personal fortune. This 
strategy however undermined the sense of exclusivity that is the core value 
of any luxury brand. The consequence was that the prestige of the Cardin 
label has suffered since the 1990s (Tungate, 2008, p. 15). 
Another great designer of the 1960s and even the 1970s was Yves 
Saint Laurent. He started out as the successor of Dior but broke away to 
open his ‘luxury prêt-à-porter’ store, the Saint Laurent Rive Gauche, in 13 
     
Paris’s Saint Germain district. With him and other French designers prêt-à-
porter displaced haute couture and ‘street wear’ displaced ‘aristocratic’ 
glamour. The designer was also heavily into licensing his YSL label but kept 
a closer eye on quality control than Cardin had done. Saint Laurent’s 
biggest hit was his Opium brand perfume, launched in 1977 and still popular 
today (Tungate, 2008, p. 16). 
In the 1960s and 1970s Italian leather goods and fur businesses 
started to grow and to establish their brands in all the principal markets. It 
was in the 1960s that the talented young designer Karl Lagerfeld helped 
turn Fendi from a small local brand into an international success. Other 
Italian brands like Armani, Gucci and Cerruti, to name a few, followed. In 
the early 1980s the Milanese seemed to dominate the luxury business. 
Tungate (2008, p. 16-17) explains the rise of the Milanese: 
They were traders at heart, and they knew how to marry art with 
commerce in a way that many French labels hadn’t quite grasped. 
 
The democratization of luxury 
Haute couture and luxury was traditionally the domain of the wealthy 
and the famous, one that ordinary people did not dare enter. The political 
revolution of the 1960s changed that by pulling down all social barriers, 
including those that separated the rich from the rest. Luxury at the time 
simply went out of fashion and stayed out of fashion until the new and 
financially powerful unmarried female executive emerged in the 1980s. The 
American inspired meritocracy became the social norm as anyone and 
everyone could move up the economic and social ladder and indulge in 
luxury. Simultaneously, disposable income rose significantly in the 
industrialized nations. Marriages were left until later in life and the number 
of children fell, freeing men and women to spend more on themselves, and 
to indulge in luxury (Thomas, 2007, p. 8). 
Thomas (2007, p. 33) illustrates the changes that took place in the 
1960s through quoting the remembrances of actress Leslie Caron:  
I stopped buying couture because, frankly, it was considered really 
old-fashioned. I remember one of the fashion magazines asked me to 
do a layout in about 1968, and they came up with people I never 
heard of like Biba. You were supposed to look like a flower child. You 
couldn’t wear hats anymore, you couldn’t wear gloves or a bra, and 
you looked really old-fashioned if you wore couture dresses. 14 
     
 
Thomas (2007, p. 34) goes on to explain what happened in the fashion 
world during the 1960s: 
It was also an end to a certain part of the luxury business. From then 
on, luxury was not longer simply about creating the finest things 
money could buy. It was about making money, a lot of money. 
Couturiers licensed their names liberally, and not just on perfumes 
and eyewear. Givenchy and Pucci both did special designer editions of 
Lincoln Continentals. Quality dropped. … Service evaporated. 
 
There are many factors that led to the exponential growth of the 
luxury industry after the 1960s. Fundamental were the sociological changes 
arising from the emancipation of women, the relative world peace, the 
disappearance of social stratification based on heritage in favor of today’s 
democratic societies, and their offspring in the egalitarian societies. The 
consumption of luxury in these new equalitarian societies is seen by 
individuals as a symbol of their belonging to a new stratification – one 
based on their bank accounts. 
These underlying sociological changes were enhanced by a general rise 
in discretionary spending power among of the world’s population through 
wage increases and falling prices, the globalization of the world markets 
that offered wide accessibility to luxury products, the  development of 
global mass media (television in particular), and the growth in international 
travel. 
Entrepreneurs and financiers saw the potential of the luxury industry, 
and begun buying or taking over traditional luxury companies from elderly 
founders or incompetent heirs and building up their brands. They introduced 
the concept of the ‘democratization of luxury’. The idea was to make luxury 
‘accessible to everyone’. Thomas (2007, p. 9-10) explains that to do this 
the new luxury industry tycoons used a two stage strategy: 
First they hyped their brands mercilessly. They trumpeted the brand’s 
historical legacy and the tradition of handcraftsmanship to give the 
products an air of luxury legitimacy. They encouraged their designers 
to stage extravagant or provocative fashion shows – at a million 
dollars a pop – to drum up controversy and make headlines. They 
spent billions of dollars on deliberately shocking advertising 
campaigns – Dior’s grease-smudged lesbian ads to sell purses, Yves 
Saint Laurent’s full-frontal male nudity shot to sell perfume – that 
made their brands as recognizable and common as Nike or Ford. 
They dressed celebrities, who in return told every reporter lining the 15 
     
red carpet which company had provided their gown, jewels, handbag, 
tuxedo, or shoes. They began to sponsor high-profile sporting and 
entertainment events such as Louis Vuitton at the American Cup and 
Chopard at the Cannes Film Festival. The message was clear: buy our 
brand and you, too, will live a luxury life. 
Then the tycoons made their products more available, economically 
and physically. They expanded their retail reach from the original 
polished-oak-paneled family shop and a few overseas franchises to a 
vast global network, rolling out thousands of stores that are as 
ubiquitous and approachable as Benetton or Gap. They opened 
outlets to sell leftovers at bargain prices, launched e-commerce sites 
on the internet, and ramped up their share of duty-free retailing. 
 
According to Thomas (2007, p. 12), the most successful of these new 
‘luxury barons’ (as she calls them) is Bernard Arnault, chairman and CEO of 
the Paris-based luxury brand group LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy). 
Besides the Luis Vuitton brand, Moët & Chandon champagne and Hennessy 
cognac, the group has over fifty other luxury brands including Dior, Dom 
Pérignon, Krug and Veuve Clicquot champagne, Givenchy couture, and Tag 
Heuer watches. In 2008 the group had fifty-six thousand employees and 
twenty-three hundred stores, and made 2 billion euros profit on 17.1 billion 
euros in sales (LVMH Group). The group’s leading luxury brand, Luis 
Vuitton, has an estimated 3.7 USD billion in annual sales (Thomas, 2007, p. 
18). 
In 2009 Forbes magazine named Arnault the fifteenth richest man in 
the world with a net worth of more than 16.5 billion USD (Forbes, 2009). 
Thomas (2007, p. 12-13) explains his success: 
When Arnault took control of LVMH in 1990, it had sales of about 3.6 
billion US dollars with net profit of 621 million USD. In 2005, it 
recorded 17.3 billion USD in sales and net profit of 1.8 billion USD. 
“What I like is the idea of transforming creativity into profitability.” 
Arnault once said. “It’s what I like most.” 
 
Thomas (2007, p. 55) highlights that the only real competitor to 
Arnault in the 1990s was the Swiss-based conglomerate Richemont which 
owns such luxury brands as Cartier, Jaeger-Lecoultre, IWC, Baume et 
Mercier, Piaget, Vacheron Constantin, Van Cleef & Arpels, Dunhill, Mont 
Blanc, and Chloé. The conglomerate is controlled by Johann Rupert, an 
Afrikaner businessman from Johannesburg, South Africa. In 2009 
Richemont made a net profit of one billion euros on 5.4 billion euros in sales 16 
     
(Richemont, 2009). Cartier accounts for about half of the group’s sales and 
a staggering 85 percent of its operating profits, according to analysts. About 
60 percent of Cartier’s earnings are reportedly from sales of watches 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 57). 
In 1999 Arnault launched a takeover bid for Gucci and lost out to 
François Pinault, a French financier who controlled the Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute (PPP) group, which includes the auction house Christie’s, the 
Printemps department store chain, and the La Redoute catalog. Pinault 
formed the Gucci Group and bought the Yves Saint Laurent Rive Gauche 
ready-to-wear and cosmetic companies. With the formation of the Gucci 
Group, Arnault now has direct competition for brands, for designers, and 
customers.  
 
Figure 3. Luxury fashion brands with sales over 500 million euros 












Source: Chevalier & Mazzalovo, 2008, p. 49 
 
 
Figure 4. Luxury fashion brands with sales between 100 and 500 million 
euros 




































Source: Chevalier & Mazzalovo, 2008, p. 49 
 
Chevalier and Mazzalovo (2008, p. 49) have put together list of what 
they consider to be the great luxury fashion brands in today’s world. The 
first list (Figure 3) is comprised of those luxury fashion brands with sales 
over 500 million euros. They explain that these brands invest heavily in 
advertising because of their high sales; have the necessary production 
volume to open boutiques all over the world, and a sufficient customer base 
for all the boutiques to be profitable. These brands are found in almost all 
luxury shopping galleries all over the world. The second list (Figure 4) 
comprises those brands with sales between 100 and 500 million euros. 
These brands, according to the authors, have a more limited presence in 
the world and are represented only by their boutiques in the major fashion 
centers like Paris, Milan, New York and Hong Kong and  maybe by a 
stronger presence in two or three countries. 
The authors also explain the overwhelming presence on the lists of the 
Italian luxury fashion brands by the inclusion of leather luxury fashion 
accessories where the Italians dominate in number but are still way behind 
the absolute sales of the two French brands – Luis Vuitton and Hermès. 
They also mention that other countries like the United States have 
successful brands but in their opinion these brands are not in the same 
categories. 
Chevalier and Mazzalovo in putting their list of luxury fashion brands 
together used a strict definition of a luxury brand as having to be absolutely 
true to its roots and be produced in a place that holds some legitimacy for 
it. They explain that they don’t consider the American brand Ralph Lauren a 
luxury brand; rather they consider it a ‘lifestyle’ brand like most other 
premium brands. Kapferer and Bastien (2009, p. 14) explain that by 18 
     
remaining faithful to its origins the luxury branded product offers an anchor 
point in a world of a culture drift, trivialization and deracination: 
A luxury brand should not yield to the temptation of relocation, which 
effectively means dislocation: a relocated product is a soulless 
product (it lost its identity), even if it is not actually anonymous (it 
still brand name) it no longer has any business in the world of luxury. 
 
Kapferer and Bastien are even stricter in their differentiation between 
luxury brands and premium brands than Chevalier and Mazzalovo are, 
arguing that it is perfectly legitimate for a premium branded product to be 
manufactured in the most suitable and most economical manufacturing 
location possible, so long as quality and service levels can be maintained. 
On the other hand they write: 
A luxury product, which carries a whole world with it, has to be 
produced in a place that is consistent with its world. Products by 
Chanel or Hermès, being manufactured in France, truly are luxury 
products; products bearing a Dior or Burberry label, on the other 
hand, being manufactured in countries where labor costs are low and 
not in France (Dior’s place of origin) or in the UK (Burberry’s place of 
origin) are no longer entitled to be called luxury products: this kind of 
relocation for cost-cutting reasons is proof that these brands do not 
have (or no longer have) a sufficiently high level of quality or 
creativity – as regards the products concerned, at any rate – to 
justify a price level that would allow them to continue to be produced 
in their country of origin. 
 
If there is one thing that changed in luxury in the last thirty hears, 
explains Thomas (2007, p. 41), it is the current single-minded focus on 
profitability. She writes: 
In the old days, when luxury brands were held companies, owners 
cared about making a profit but the primary objective in-house was 
to produce the finest possible. Since the tycoons have taken over 
however, that objective has been replaced by a phenomenon I call 
the cult of luxury. Today, luxury brand items are collected like 
baseball cards, displayed like artwork, brandished like iconography. 
Arnault and his fellow luxury tycoons have shifted the focus from 
what the product is to what it represents. To achieve this, they 
“enhance (the) timelessness” as Arnault likes to say, by trumpeting a 
company’s heritage; hire a hip young designer to give it a sexy, 
modern edge; strengthen the branding by streamlining the name 
(Christian Dior has become simply Dior, Burberry lost its ‘s’) and 
splashing the logo on everything from handbags to bikinis, and 
advertise the entire package relentlessly to spread the new gospel to 
the masses. 
 19 
     
The Japanese motivated spread of luxury brands 
In the early 1970s Japan’s GDP had been growing at an average of 
some 9.5 percent per year with per capita income rising to reach that of 
Western Europe (Hedrick-Wong, 2007, p. 22). This was also the period that 
the Japanese tourist-shoppers became a noticeable phenomenon in Europe. 
The French, Italian and Swiss luxury houses saw the opportunity and 
started setting up sales branches in Japan. Gucci opened its first store in 
Tokyo in 1972 in response to demand from Japanese tourists in Europe, 
while Louis Vuitton followed for the same reason in 1978 (Chadha & 
Husband, 2006, p. 16). 
Japan’s amazing economic success after the Second World War can be 
measured by the growth of its economy. In 1955 Japan’s economy was half 
the size of the economies of France and Britain with per capita income well 
under that of even Italy. From 1955 to 1995 (in 40 years) the Japanese 
economy grew by 230 percent in US dollar terms to become the second 
largest national economy in the world behind only the United States. It is 
more than three times the size of the French economy, and more than four 
times the size of the British economy (Abegglen, 2006, p. 24). The 
Japanese economic growth from poverty immediately after the Second 
World War to wealth in such a short time has no precedent in world history 
and explains why the number of Japanese tourist shoppers in Europe grew 
to such gigantic proportions in the 1980s and 1990s.  
With the opening of luxury fashion boutiques in Japan, the Japanese 
began buying luxury goods furiously at home while also still shopping 
maniacally in Europe. A study by JP Morgan estimated that Japanese 
tourists represented more than 80 percent of Luis Vuitton’s Champ Elysées 
store sales (Chadha & Husband, 2006, p. 16). The wider the Japanese 
traveled, the more branded stores were opened at all their favorite 
destinations, from Hawaii’s boutiques on Kalakaua Avenue to Hong Kong’s 
plush Landmark shopping center (followed later by the mall at the 
International Financial Center). The Japanese were the driving force behind 
the growth of luxury fashion retail all over Asia and were responsible for the 
growth in duty-free luxury sales in all their travel destinations such as 20 
     
Seoul, Taipei and Bangkok to mention only the more important ones 
(Chadha & Husband, 2006, p. 16). 
The success with the Japanese generated extraordinary profits for the 
luxury fashion industry and encouraged the firms to expand globally into 
the traditional luxury markets such as Paris, London, New York, Rome, 
Milan and Hong Kong following the Japanese shoppers but also attracting 
the rich local clients (Thomas, 2007, p. 87). The success in these markets 
motivated further expansions to new locales such as Beverly Hills and Las 
Vegas. Today the major luxury fashion brands (Figure 3) have boutiques in 
all the major luxury galleries in the world. 
 
The luxury brands addicted Japanese 
The Japanese addiction to Western luxury fashion brands arose in the 
1960s and 1970s with the extraordinary economic growth of the country, 
and the resulting rapid expansion of the new middle class that wanted to 
show off their success. Because in the densely populated island nation the 
Western way to enjoy as well as to exhibit one’s riches - with grand homes 
and large properties in plush neighborhoods - was near impossible, the 
Japanese chose to show their wealth by dressing richly. Additionally, the 
dense traffic and tight parking discouraged luxury cars, giving further 
impetus to the trend of wearing Western luxury fashion brands to show off 
their success and new social status. For the post Second World War 
generation of Japanese, the more expensive the luxury articles worn the 
higher the status of the person wearing them. The ultimate status symbols 
in Japan are luxury fashion goods such as couture clothes, leather purses, 
shoes and accessories, silk scarves, watches, furs, and jewels (Thomas, 
2007, p. 75; and Chadha & Husband, 2006, p. 84-85). 
In Japan and across much of Asia making money is only part of an 
individual’s success. To gain social stature they have to let the world know 
that they have it. This is the ‘conspicuous consumption’ described by Veblen 
(1994). For this reason luxury fashion brands became modern symbols used 
to redefine individual’s identity and social position. The paradox in Japanese 
society however, is that the Japanese are aggressive conspicuous 
consumers but they never show off. This is because conformity is imprinted 21 
     
into them from childhood. The guiding principle behind conformity is the 
creation of harmony. The natural corollary to conformity is that they stop 
thinking for themselves and adopt neatly packaged concepts. 
With individual thinking discouraged, the average Japanese relies on 
‘higher authority’ to provide guidance. Leading luxury fashion magazines 
have a certain influence in building fashion trends in the world. In Japan 
these magazines enjoy a different level of power: they dictate fashion. The 
Japanese did not question what luxury fashion editors recommended, they 
just followed these recommendations as if they were law. The Japanese 
consumers are such diligent followers of luxury fashion magazines and the 
lifestyle they present that they form tribes that are nicknamed after the 
magazines. For this reason the Japanese consumers of luxury brands never 
show off. They simply conform with their social group by wearing the right 
luxury fashion, or they wear the luxury fashion of the social group they 
aspire to belong to. Japan is a very egalitarian society, so nobody wants to 
stand out (Chadha & Husband, 2006, p. 83). If a particular social group 
carries Luis Vuitton bags, an individual that aspires to belong to that group 
also has to wear one, and she will make all the necessary personal and 
financial sacrifices to acquire it. 
The only way to shine in Japan’s very egalitarian society is by 
demonstrating a superior ‘savoir faire’. For this reason Japanese consumers 
are amazingly diligent readers and followers of luxury fashion magazines. 
Showing off is done in a very subtle way, through the sophisticated use of 
up to date fashion knowledge. The point is not to buy the most expensive 
thing: it is to buy the latest trend in luxury fashion. The Japanese 
consumers don’t want to show only that they have money, they also want 
to let their social group know that they have a sophisticated knowledge of 
luxury fashion. 
An additional factor is that Japanese women have an extremely low 
status in what is essentially a male-dominated society. Chadha and 
Husband (2006, p. 95-96) explain that women are discriminated against at 
work with only a small chance of rising above clerical level. At home they 
have to serve their husbands, at work their bosses. As a result women’s self 
esteem is extremely low. For them buying luxury fashion goods becomes an 22 
     
affirmation of their existence, and of momentary power. The luxury stores 
in Japan with their outstanding levels of service are the only places they are 
pampered and respected. Women in Japan go shopping just to experience 
the pleasure of being served. 
To be able to afford luxury a whole generation of young working 
women, in their mid 20s to early 30s, have postponed marriage to continue 
living in the comfort of their parental homes (Nishi & Kan, 2006, March 
22).. These women are the Japanese phenomena that Masahito Yamada, 
professor at the Tokyo Gakaguei University called ‘parasite singles’ in his 
1999 bestselling book The Age of Parasite Singles (Roberts, 2002, p. 60). 
They generally work in low status jobs in large corporations and have little 
chance of getting the managerial jobs that are mostly reserved for men. 
Tolbert (2000) wrote a vivid description of one of these women in the 
Washington Post: 
Miki Takasu is 26 years old, beautiful, drives a BMW and carries a 
2,800 USD Chanel handbag--when she isn't using her Gucci, Prada or 
Vuitton purses. She vacations in Switzerland, Thailand, Los Angeles, 
New  York  and  Hawaii.  Happily  unmarried,  living  with  her  parents 
while  working  as  a  bank  teller,  she  is  what  people  here  call  a 
"parasite single"… 
…They  shop.  Rings  and  watches  by  Cartier,  Bulgari,  and  Hermes 
costing 2,000 to 3,000 USD are particularly popular among working 
women, who buy themselves presents for special occasions--a Cartier 
ring to celebrate her 10th anniversary on the job, or a gift to herself 
on turning 30.  
They  travel.  Miki,  who  earns about  28,000  USD  a  year,  frequently 
makes quick shopping trips to Korea, has been to Hawaii three times 
and to Malaysia and Egypt as well--all with girlfriends. 
 
Another colorful but very insightful description of the ‘parasite singles’ 
and their impact on Japanese society was given by Orestein (2001) in The 
New York Times: 
More than half of Japanese women are still single by 30 -- compared 
with about 37 percent of American women -- and nearly all of them 
live  at  home  with  mom  and  dad.  Labeled  ‘parasite  singles’  (after 
‘Parasite  Eve,"  a  Japanese  horror  flick  in  which  extraterrestrial 
hatchlings feed off unsuspecting human hosts before bursting, ‘Alien’-
style, through their bellies), they pay no rent, do no housework and 
come  and  go  freely.  Although  they  earn,  on  average,  just  27,000 
USD a year, they are Japan's leading consumers, since their entire 
income is disposable. Despite Japan's continuing recession, they have 
created  a  boom  in  haute  couture  accessories  by  Louis  Vuitton, 23 
     
Bulgari,  Fendi  and  Prada,  as  well  as  in  cell  phones,  mini-cars  and 
other  luxury  goods.  They  travel  more  widely  than  their  higher-
earning  male  peers,  dress  more  fashionably  and  are  more 
sophisticated about food and culture.  
While their spending sprees keep the Japanese economy afloat, their 
skittishness about traditional roles may soon threaten to capsize it. 
Japan's population is aging more rapidly than any on the planet -- by 
2015 one in four Japanese will be elderly. The birthrate has sunk to 
1.34 per woman, well below replacement levels. (The birthrate in the 
United States, by contrast, is 2.08.) Last year, Japan dropped from 
the eighth-largest nation in the world to the ninth. The smallest class 
in  recorded  history  just  entered  elementary  school.  Demographers 
predict that within two decades the shrinking labor force will make 
pension taxes and health care costs untenable, not to mention that 
there  will  not be  enough workers  to  provide  basic  services  for  the 
elderly. There are whispers that to avoid ruin, Japan may have to do 
the  unthinkable:  encourage  mass  immigration,  changing  the  very 
notion of what it means to be Japanese.  
Politicians, economists and the media blame parasite women for the 
predicament. (Unmarried men can also be parasitic, but they have 
received far less scrutiny.) "They are like the ancient aristocrats of 
feudal  times,  but  their  parents  play  the  role  of  servants,"  says 
Masahiro  Yamada,  a  sociologist  who  coined  the  derogatory  but 
instantly popular term "Parasite Single" (The clock on his 15 minutes 
of  fame  has  been  ticking  ever  since).  "Their  lives  are  spoiled.  The 
only thing that's important to them is seeking pleasure."  
He  may  be  right:  parasite  women  may  indeed  be  a  sign  of 
decadence,  a  hangover  from  the  intoxicating  materialism  of  the 
Bubble years of the 80's. But that conclusion, the most common one 
in  the  Japanese  press,  misses  something  more  substantive:  an 
unconscious  protest  against  the  rigidity  of  both  traditional  family 
roles and Japan's punishing professional system. "Maybe they appear 
to  be  spoiled,"  says  Yoko  Kunihiro,  a  sociologist  who  studies 
dissatisfaction  among  women  in  their  30's,  "but  you  could  also 
perceive ‘parasite singles’ as the embodiment of a criticism against 
society.  Seen  from  the  perspective  of  conventional  values,  even 
feminist  values,  they  seem  like  a  very  negative  force,  but  I  see 
something positive in them." 
… Long before Makiko Tanaka (a Japanese politician, the daughter of 
former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka) there was Mariko Bando, one 
of  Japan's  best-known  female  politicians;  she  is  currently  director 
general of the Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office and a regular 
on the pundit circuit. Her bureau is charged with the amorphous task 
of "encouraging other ministries to look at gender issues" as well as 
strategizing on how to better support mothers in the workplace. So 
far, she has generated lots of paper with few results, which has been 
frustrating.  
Rather  than  dismissing  the  parasites  as  merely  spoiled  children, 
overindulged by their parents, Bando says she believes there is also 
an economic explanation for the phenomenon. "We understand why 
Japanese  women  don't  want  to  have  children,"  she  says.  "Once 24 
     
they're  married,  they  have  to  do  all  the  housework.  Japanese 
husbands may help some, but they won't share the burden. Also, if 
women work as hard as men they can be promoted -- not always, but 
it's possible -- but if they have children and stop working, it's virtually 
impossible  to  re-enter  the  work  force.  Many  well-educated  women 
quit  and  become  housewives  whether  they  want  to  or  not.  So 
instead, women are postponing marriage and/or childbirth."  
The typical employment pattern for women in Japan is age-related, 
following an M curve: it peaks by 24, drops sharply, then spikes again 
in the early 50's (when former housewives take low-level part-time 
jobs)  before  falling  off  for  good  at  55.  By  comparison,  American 
women's employment stays steady from their 20's until around 60. 
Some Japanese economists believe that boosting women's labor-force 
participation rate to U.S. levels during their 30's, 40's and 50's would 
lower inflation and raise the G.D.P. It would offset the labor shortage 
caused by the declining birthrate and revitalize Japan's economy. But 
that doesn't appear to be an argument either government or business 
is  heeding;  according  to  the  Economic  Planning  Agency,  working 
conditions  for  women  have  actually  worsened  in  Japan  since  the 
1980's. "They agree in principle," Bando says, "but a lot of men in 
the government are themselves uncomfortable with working mothers 
as colleagues."  
…. One spring afternoon, I visited Mitsuko Shimomura, a pioneering 
female journalist who, in her 60's, has taken over for her 90-year-old 
mother as administrator of her family's health clinic in Tokyo. She is 
also director of the Gender Equity Center in Fukushima prefecture, 
about an hour and a half outside Tokyo. "I don't regret the decline in 
the  birthrate,"  Shimomura  told  me.  "I  think  it's  a  good  thing.  The 
parasites  have  unintentionally  created  an  interesting  movement. 
Politicians  now  have  to  beg  women  to  have  babies.  Unless  they 
create a society where women feel comfortable having children and 
working, Japan will be destroyed in a matter of 50 or 100 years. And 
child subsidies aren't going to do it. Only equality is." 
 
In 2009, almost half of Japan’s single population between the age of 
20 and 30 (an estimated 11 million women but also including men in 2008) 
are ‘parasite singles’ (Simms, 2009, November 26). They are blamed for 
the  steady  decline  in  sales  of  durable  household  goods  (refrigerators, 
furniture, washing machines) in Japan, and credited with the booming sales 
of  luxury  goods,  especially  of  luxury  fashion  brands  like  Gucci,  Prada, 
Hermès, Dior, Givenchy and especially Louis Vuitton (Chadha & Husband, 
2006, p. 85-87). 25 
     
The uncertain future of The luxury brands industry in Japan 
According to a McKinsey Asia study (Atsmon et al., 2009) Japan 
showed a significant 7 percent decline in the luxury market from 2007 to 
2008. This is surprising because the world as a whole had a healthy 5 
percent growth in the same period despite the global financial crisis The rest 
of Asia, led by China, had an extraordinary 17 percent growth while Europe 
had 7 percent growth and the rest of the world had a strong 9 percent 
growth. Even the US, where Wall Street was in the center of the financial 
crisis, managed to grow 1 percent. 
The explanation for the significant and exceptional decline in the 
Japanese luxury market lies beyond the financial crisis of 2007-8 that 
affected the entire world, or even the bursting of the luxury brand bubble 
that started in the early 2000s when newly rich bankers, traders, real-
estate agents, and entrepreneurs started spending money on luxury goods. 
The financial crisis may have been responsible for the initial triggering of 
the luxury brand bubble that was fueling the growth of the luxury market, 
and for some part of the recent fall in sales, but certainly cannot account for 
such a significant decline. The explanation for the extraordinary decline of 7 
percent from 2007 to 2008 (Atsmon et al., 2009) probably lies in the rapid 
aging of the Japanese population, and (in a more significant and worrisome 
trend for the luxury industry) in the long term shift in Japanese behavior 
toward luxury brands. 
Japan had a population of 127 million in March 2009, making it the 
tenth most populous country in the world. Although the country saw a rapid 
growth in population during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Figure 5), 
this growth came to a standstill from 2000 onward when Japan was ranked 
the 9th most populous country in the world with the same 127 million 
population as in 2009. The population ranking of Japan had dropped from 
7th to 8th in 1990 and from 8th to 9th in 1998. 
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Figure 5. Japan’s population growth and projected decline 
 
Source: Aging of Japan, Wikipedia 
 
After the 1970s Japan’s population growth rate slowed due to the 
steady decline in the birth rate (Figure 6) that was compensated by for the 
rising life expectancy of the population. Today Japan has one of the highest 
life expectancies in the world at 81 years, and also the highest proportion of 
elderly citizens: 22 percent over the age of 65. This demographic group is 
expected to increase to 40 percent by 2055 (Aging of Japan, Wikipedia). 
The rapid graying of Japan can also be seen by the fall in the youngest 
proportion of the population, where those aged up to14 years represent 
only 13.5 percent of the total population. The consequence is that the 
productive population, or those aged 15 to 64, is expected to decline from 
81.64 million in 2009 to 45.95 million in 2055.  
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Figure 6. Japan’s birth and death rate from 1950 to 2008 (The 1966 drop 
in birth rates was due to Chinese zodiac year of the ‘Fire Horse’) 
 
Source: Demographics of Japan, Wikipedia 
 
The most significant demographic impact of the graying of Japan upon 
the luxury market is the decline in the number of the ‘parasite singles’ who 
represent about half of the women and men in their age bracket and spend 
furiously on luxury fashion branded goods. As a consequence of the aging of 
the Japanese population their absolute number (but not the percentage in 
their age bracket) decreased 5 percent to 11 million in the last year 
(Simms, 2009, November 26). 
This 5 percent decrease in the number of the ‘parasite singles’ (the 
greatest consumers of luxury goods) is probably the largest single factor 
responsible for the decline of the Japanese luxury market from 2007 to 
2008. The bad news for the luxury industry is that a decrease in the 
absolute number of ‘parasite singles’ in Japan will continue in the future 
with the aging of the Japanese population, and with them the consumption 
of luxury fashion goods will also decline. 
Japan is a mature wealthy nation and society. The country moved from 
total defeat and utter poverty after the Second World War to become the 
third largest economy in the world behind the European Union and the US 
(Figure 7). The Japanese companies made this historic feat possible by 28 
     
copying and adapting Western technology within organizations entirely 
based on Japanese cultural values. Abegglen (2006, p. 7) writes: 
Japanese companies are not simple economic machines with the 
purpose of rewarding shareholders and executives. The curious 
Anglo-American notion that all is owned to the shareholders has no 
currency in Japan. The primary stakeholders in the kaisha (Japanese 
corporation) are its members, the employees. 
 
These values have made Japan the most equalitarian society in the 
world. The income of the richest 10 percent of the population in Japan is 
only 4.5 times higher than the income of the lowest 10 percent. This 
contrasts with an income inequality in the US of 15.9 times, in Germany of 
6.9 times, in France 9.1 times, and in Italy 11.6 times (Human 
Development Report 2007/2008, 2007, p. 281). 
 
Figure 7. The ten largest national economies in the World (and the 
European Union) in 2008, measured in nominal GDP (millions of USD), 
according to International Monetary Fund 
 
Source: List of countries by GDP (nominal). Wikipedia 
 
 
Japan’s equalitarian society is a possible explanation of why the 
Japanese are so addicted to luxury brands as this consumption allows them 
to recreate some degree of social stratification. Because of their relatively 
good financial means they are able to use luxury fashion goods to define 29 
     
themselves socially as they wish. Thus they use luxury as badges for their 
social aspirations, which is why they have such a need to show the brands. 
Japan’s current industrial and demographic structure means that the 
high economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s will not return. After 
extraordinary economic success the environment for Japanese companies 
changed in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1993, land and share price 
values collapsed in Japan. The usual government remedies to resuscitate 
the economy did not work, and in 1995 Japanese companies, realizing that 
the growth period was over, started reorganizing vigorously and effectively 
(Abegglen, 2006, p. 8-9). They changed their focus from gaining market 
share to cash flow to pay off their debts and begun to prepare for the 
anticipated ‘labor shortage’ by investing heavily in automation and robotics. 
Because of the future ‘labor shortage’ there are plans in Japan to 
extend the current retirement age of 60 years as it now does not make 
sense in a country with the longest life expectancy in the world (Abegglen, 
2006, p. 22). Another positive aspect of the ‘labor shortage’ is the need to 
bring more women into the workforce. In the US the need to bring women 
into the workforce during the Second World War was one of the key factors 
that helped American women to obtain equal rights with men in the labor 
market. This could also happen in Japan with similar effects upon the 
fashion and luxury markets. 
Long before the financial crisis of 2007-8, fundamental shifts in the 
attitude and behavior of luxury consumers were underway in Japan and the 
rest of the world. The crisis has brought these shifts to the fore, suggesting 
that they are not temporary. One of the most important trends is that 
luxury consumers and even designers are becoming disillusioned with the 
vulgarization of luxury brands. Thomas (2007, p. 325-326), explaining this 
delusion of ‘democratized luxury’, reproduces an interview she conducted 
with the famous designer luxury fashion Tom Ford. During the interview 
Ford said: 
Luxury fashion brands today are too available, everything is too 
uniform, and customer business too pedestrian. It is like McDonald’s, 
the merchandise and philosophy behind it is very similar. You get the 
same hamburger and the same experience in every McDonald’s. 
Same with Vuitton. We helped create that at Gucci. It was in the air 
and needed to be addressed, and I’m proud of what we 30 
     
accomplished. But it’s not what I’m interested in now. I’m in a 
backlash. All these handbag ads make me sick. It’s so formulaic. And 
it’s foolish to think that customers are not going to tune out, that 
they aren’t as bored with it as we are. I believe that the little 
companies are the big ones. There are lessons we can learn from 
small, old-fashioned luxury. 
 
The ‘democratization of luxury’ promoted by the large luxury brand 
conglomerates is without doubt the main force behind the vulgarization of 
most traditional luxury fashion brands. Their expansion into the mass 
market gave rise to an ever growing counterfeit industry, and the need for 
luxury outlets. Many consumers today are satisfying their craving for luxury 
brands by buying cheap fake versions that they can pass off as real. 
Another cheap source for consumers to satisfy their need for luxury brands 
are the luxury outlets. These outlets are the consequence of the push by 
the luxury industry to increase sales by bringing out increasingly trendy 
collections of clothes, handbags and shoes each season. These products 
have a short fashion life span before they are displaced by the next 
collection. To sell the remaindered stock from past collections the luxury 
conglomerates have created luxury outlets where they are sold at heavy 
discounted prices. Both the cheap fakes and the cheap remainders are 
definitively contributing to the vulgarization of luxury fashion brands. 
Besides the vulgarization trend that is certainly affecting Japanese 
luxury consumers, the McKinsey Asia study (Atsmon et al., 2009) has 
detected that the ‘luxury brands as badges’ mentality used to define social 
stratification and that transformed the Japanese into luxury brand addicts is 
losing ground to different and more personal symbols. It is almost inevitable 
that Japanese consumers will become more confident (like the Americans 
and Europeans) and express their aspirations without relying on ‘luxury 
brands as badges’. Some middle-market fashion brands such as Zara, Gap, 
H&M, and Banana Republic have taken advantage of this increased 
confidence and have moved into the Japanese market. As a consequence 
traditional luxury fashion brands have new competitors for their share of the 
Japanese luxury consumer’s wallet. 
The McKinsey Asia study (Atsmon et al., 2009) study detected four 
important shifts in consumer attitudes and channel trends that are 31 
     
contributing to the Japanese luxury market downturn. These shifts are: the 
decline of conformity and the rise of individuality; an increasing preference 
for luxury experience rather than luxury goods; the proliferation of choices 
and the resulting fragmentation of the ‘luxury wallet’; and the diminishing 
importance of the department store. It should be noted thought that their 
last finding about the diminishing importance of department stores is 
vigorously contested by Fluch (2009, September 18), who points out that 
not all department stores are as alike as the McKinsey Asia study implies, 
and that some, like the Isetan department stores, that are not mentioned in 
the study are in fact tremendously successful. 
McInnes (2009, April 12) reporting on the 2009 Japan Fashion Week 
writes:  
The luxury market is taking a beating; world-famous German 
minimalist fashion designer Jil Sander is working with Uniqlo, H&M 
are taking over Tokyo high streets and Number (N)ine, a top 
Japanese menswear label, has gone out of business. It would be fair 
to say that the fashion industry is in a state of flux. 
 
Figure 8. Picture taken during the 2009 Japan Fashion Week that 
remembers the ‘mod’ fashion revolution of the 1960s that made traditional 
luxury haute couture old-fashioned 
 
 
Source: McInnes, 2009, April 12 32 
     
 
The picture above (Figure 8) taken during the 2009 Japan Fashion 
week and which illustrates McInnes article, strongly resembles the ‘mod and 
hippy fashion revolution’ of the 1960s. This fashion revolution started on 
London’s Carnaby Street and overran the world (Carnaby Street, Wikipedia) 
and made traditional luxury haute couture old-fashioned (Thomas, 2007, p. 
33). The crucial questions are: Will Japan in the near future undergo a 
similar fashion revolution? Will the young Japanese consumers, like 
Westerners did in the 1960s, express their individuality by abandoning the 
conformity of the ‘luxury brand badges’ in defining social status? 
 
Conclusion 
Japanese luxury consumers were the driving force behind the 
globalization of luxury fashion retail. They are the world’s biggest spenders 
on luxury goods (Figure 2), with a per capita spending of 156 USD. This is 
almost double the 85 USD spent by the Americans, and more than the 
double the 71 USD dollars spent by Europeans. In 2008 the approximately 
20 billion USD Japanese luxury market was the third largest in the world 
behind Europe and the US (Figure 1). The Japanese luxury market is also 
the world’s only ‘luxury mass market’. For all these reasons the large 
sudden and unparalleled 7% decline in the Japanese luxury market in 2008 
is a strong indicator that the heyday is over for the large luxury brand 
conglomerates such as Bernard Arnault’s LVMH or François Pinault’s PPP. 
The principal factors contributing to the decline of the luxury market in 
Japan were the 5 percent decrease in ‘parasite singles’ (the avid consumers 
of luxury brands) due to the rapid aging of the Japanese population, and the 
rising confidence of Japanese consumers that they don’t need ‘luxury 
brands as badges’ to show their success. Additionally, the Japanese 
consumer is being negatively influenced by the rapid worldwide 
vulgarization of the traditional luxury brands and the appearance of new 
middle market brands such as Zara, Gap, H&M, and Banana Republic that 
have taken advantage of this vulgarization and are now competing for their 
share of the luxury wallet. 33 
     
Because the factors contributing to the decline of the luxury market in 
Japan reflect permanent changes in Japanese demographics and consumer 
attitudes and behavior, for the luxury industry to continue to be successful 
in Japan and probably in the world it must find ways to learn and adapt its 
marketing strategy to the new reality. Eventually the large luxury 
conglomerates have to return to the origin of their luxury brands and make 
fine high quality and exclusive luxury goods for selected few consumers that 
can afford them, or otherwise accept that the popularization (or 
vulgarization) of their traditional luxury brands means that they have 
become mere premium brands that will compete with other premium brands 
in the middle market. 
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